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Abstract
This paper presents a computational macroeconomic model which
closely associates Keynesian thinking and an agent-based approach.
This model is original because we do not introduce any causality be-
tween macroeconomic variables. Instead of postulate macroeconomic
properties, we want to understand them by the methodic reconstruc-
tion of the conditions of their emergence, starting from their most
elementary foundations: the interactions between individual agents.
This model is the model of a dynamic out-of-equilibrium economy
composed of two principal sets of agents (firms and households) asso-
ciated with two main functions (production and consumption). The
agents are not representative agents or aggregates but autonomous in-
dividuals in direct and indirect interactions, each of them pursuing its
own purposes, acting according to their individual state and their local
environment, without worrying about the general equilibrium of the
system and without any overriding control.
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Understanding the nature of the
behavior through time of
economic forces may someday
become synonymous with being
able to program and simulate
the processes determining the
behavior of these variables.
Cohen (1960)
1 Introduction
This paper presents a computational macroeconomic model1 which
closely associates Keynesian thinking and an agent-based approach.
This model is original because we do not introduce any causality be-
tween macroeconomic variables. Instead of postulate macroeconomic
properties, we want to understand them by the methodic reconstruc-
tion of the conditions of their emergence2, starting from their most
elementary foundations. In a classic way, we locate this foundations
at the level of the interactions between individual agents.
“To build up a causal model, we must start not from equilib-
rium relations but from the rules and motives governing hu-
man behavior. We therefore have to specify to what kind of
economy the model applies, for various kinds of economies
have different rules [. . . ] Our present purpose is to find
the simplest kind of model that will reflect conditions in
the modern capitalist world. [. . . ] Our model, therefore,
depicts a system in which production is organized by in-
dividual firms and consumption by individual households,
interacting with each other without any overriding control.”
(Robinson 1962, p. 34)
Taking Robinson seriously, we can give a more precise description of
the model we want to build: it is the model of a dynamic out-of-
equilibrium economy composed of two principal sets of agents (firms
1The interested reader will find in Seppecher (2009) a description (in French) of
a first version of this model. This model is implemented as a Java application
(Jamel). This application, together with several scenarios, is executable on the webpage
http://hp.gredeg.cnrs.fr/Pascal_Seppecher/jamel/index.php.
2We follow here Epstein (1999) and Tesfatsion (2003).
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and households) associated with two main functions (production and
consumption); these functions operate within the framework of capi-
talist economies (private property of the means of production, mone-
tary exchanges, wage earning); agents are autonomous individuals in
direct and indirect interactions (and not representative agents or ag-
gregates), each of them pursuing its own purposes, acting according to
their individual state and their local environment, unconcerned about
the general equilibrium of the system and without any overriding con-
trol (neither from a planner, nor from an auctioneer).
In section 2 we trace the outlines of the model. The following
sections detail the construction of the model following a bottom-up
approach: the section 3 presents the real and monetary objects that
the agents manipulate when interacting; the section 4 is devoted to the
description of the markets, that are nothing but places where agents
establish direct and decentralized relationships; the section 5 presents
the different types of agents that populate the model and gives a de-
scription of their behavior functions.
2 Outlines
The model we have built operates at a level of abstraction that is lower
that of classical macroeconomic models because it takes into account
several elements of real world complexity:
• the large number of agents, their heterogeneity, their autonomy,
• the decentralization of interactions between the agents,
• the asynchronous parallelism of real and monetary processes that
the agents implement.
We focus on these aspects of the model and on their consequences on
the macroeconomic dynamics of the system, on its capacity to endure
through time maintaining some stability. The model we want to build
is not a forecasting model but a research model; so we are not trying to
make a complete model and we reject all elements of complexity that
do not seem essential for our purpose, while preserving the capacities
of the model to be extended later.
This section gives an overview of the model, describes the main sim-
plifying hypothesis we have adopted, justifies our technical approach.
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2.1 A model of a monetary production econ-
omy
2.1.1 A closed economy
All things (money, labor powers, commodities) that circulate in the
model are endogenous. There is no exchange with the rest of the
world.
2.1.2 Money
The money that circulates in the model is credit money. It is a token
money, a number written in the account book of the bank. Payments
are made by way of checks or credit transfers, thus the bank is the
only agent that can directly manipulate money.
2.1.3 Commodities
All firms produce the same type of good, which is a non-perishable
consumption good that firms can be stored without depletion. How-
ever, it is assumed that households immediately consume the goods
upon purchase.
2.1.4 Productive capital
In contrast to money and commodities, the productive capital of firms
— the machines — is given. There is no productive investment, no
innovation, no growth.
2.1.5 Time
The model operates sequentially. Each loop of the program corre-
sponds to a basic period of the model. Its duration is defined as the
lapse of time between two consecutive payment of income (wages and
dividends) to households. So, we will consider that the duration an
elementary period equals one month.
That does not mean that all events in a period are simultaneous.
The internal structure of a period is also sequential and we distinguish,
within a basic period t, 8 stages (t+ 07 , t+
1
7 ,. . . to t+
7
7) each of them
corresponding to a specific state of the system. The sequence diagram
of monetary flows (figure 1, page 6) gives a graphical representation of
the sequence of monetary states and transitions within the period t.
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If the interval of time between two successive payments of income is
fixed by the structure of the model, the two other important durations
— production time, credit term — are exogenous parameters, given in
a number of basic periods.
2.2 Decentralization
To model the decentralized characteristic of market economies, we pop-
ulate the model with multiple, heterogenous, autonomous, competitive
agents.
2.2.1 Multiplicity
The model contains three types of agents: households, firms, and a
bank. The number of agents of each type is given.
Households: Usually, households are the most numerous agents.
The main functions of households are work and consumption. To con-
sume, households must get an income; to get an income, they must
have a job or be a owner of a firm or bank. The unemployed households
receive no income. Whatever the circumstances, a household does not
disappear.
Firms: Firms are usually less numerous than households, since each
firm can employ several households. The main function of firms is pro-
duction. Each firm has a single owner, a household selected at random
from the set of all households that populate the simulation. Each firm
borrows money, hires or fires workers, produces and sells goods, pays
back loans and pays dividends to its owner. A firm can be bankrupt
and then disappears. One year later, the bankrupt firm is automati-
cally replaced by a new identical firm (same size and productivity).
Bank: The bank differs from households and firms since it is a single
agent, that represents the whole banking sector. Indeed, in an economy
with endogenous money, the banking sector is usually considered as
accommodating: because the willingness of firms to produce is at the
origin of the money creation3, the disaggregation of the banking sector
seems to be not essential to the study of macroeconomic dynamics of
modeled economy.
3See Le Bourva (1959, p. 721).
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Figure 1: Sequence diagram of monetary flows
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The bank can be bankrupt and the disappears. As the bank is
a representative bank for the whole banking sector, its presence is
essential; its failure means then a systemic crisis and the simulation
breaks off.
Scale: We have seen that the model can contain only one single
bank, on the contrary it tolerates theoretically any number of firms
and households. As the model is situated at a high level of abstraction,
it cannot claim to be a model of decision and prevision, so it is useless
to populate the model with a realistic number of agents. Experience
proves that with hundreds of firms and thousands of households, it is
feasible to manage very speedy simulations presenting results robust
enough.
2.2.2 Heterogeneity
Agents are heterogenous first because there divided in three classes
(households, firms, bank) with different functions. Nonetheless, it is
heterogeneity with one class of agents that is important to model the
decentralized character of market economies.
We do not focus on the exogenous characteristics of agents — ini-
tial allocations, behavior parameters — but on the endogenous het-
erogeneity that results from agent activity : different states (employed
or unemployed, good or bad debtor. . . ) or different levels (inventory
stocks, liquidities, debts. . . ).
2.2.3 Autonomy
Agents are modeled as simple reactive agents. Agents do not have ac-
cess to any macroeconomic information (such as average level of prices
or wages, inflation rate or unemployment rate. . . ). Each agent adjusts
its behavior regarding effective disequilibria between its internal state
and its goals. The goals of agents are defined relating to exogenous
normal levels and there are no learning processes. Reaction functions
of agents are partly stochastic.
2.2.4 Competition
Social networks have a restricted place in the model. Social relations
are limited to the relations employer–employed and provider–customer
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between the households and the firms and to the relation creditor–
debtor between the bank and the firms. Morever, relations employer–
employed and provider–customer are weak relations, frequently chal-
lenged on the goods market and the labor market. There is no direct
relation between agents of a same class — no class solidarity — all rela-
tions between households and between firms consist merely of relations
of competition through markets.
2.3 A computational model
Considering the complexity of the projected model, we have decided to
build the model from scratch instead of to use an existing agent-based
simulation platform. We have written the code of the model using the
programming language Java.
2.3.1 A high level language
Java is a high level object-oriented programming language. Accord-
ing to Axtell (2004, p. 12), the use of higher level languages like Java
“surely pushes back [agent-based models] frontiers by further gener-
ations”. While slower than C++, Java is easier to use thanks to a
radical simplification of the memory management.
2.3.2 A cross-platform language
Java is a cross-platform language: the same program is able to run
on all operating systems that support Java. In this sense, the Java
language is universal; this is an important property since the program-
ming language of the model is its “natural theoretical language”4.
2.3.3 Graphical user interface
Several java libraries are available that make easy the building of
graphical user interface. Particularly, the free library JFreeChart pro-
vide a wide variety of charts adapted to the dynamic presentation of
economic data.
4“The quasi resolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problemistic search, and or-
ganizational learning are central phenomena with which our models must deal. On our
judgment, the natural theoritical language for describing a process involving these phe-
nomena is the language of a computer program.” (Cyert and March 1963, p. 125)
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2.3.4 Web application
Java allows to create “applets”— applications that can be embedded
in a web page and executed in any web browser.
2.4 Notations
We use, to designate the variables of the model, a notation system
derived from the one of Godley and Lavoie (2007): capital letters
denote values at current prices, the lower case denotes volumes, greek
letters denote ratios and elasticities. Stars denote targeted values.
3 Objects of real and monetary spheres
The model is formed by two coupled systems, one representing the
real sphere, the other the monetary sphere. The rules of functioning
of these two systems are imposed upon the agents. The implementa-
tion of the model in a oriented object language and the encapsulation
of the real and monetary data within objects ensures compliance with
physical constraints — rules of production, transfer, and destruction of
goods — and with monetary constraints — rules of creation, transfer,
and destruction of money. Firms and households interact by manipu-
lating objects of the real and monetary spheres while the bank operates
only in the monetary sphere. The interaction diagram (figure 2, page
10) gives a representation of the real and monetary interactions pro-
jected onto two parallel plans.
3.1 Objects of real sphere
The objects of the real sphere represent physical objects and processes
that play a role in the production of goods.
The real sphere comprises 5 classes of objects:
• the LaborPower,
• the Factory,
• the Machine,
• the ProductionProcess,
• the Goods.
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Figure 2: Interaction diagram, real and monetary flows
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3.1.1 Labor power
A LaborPower object represents the labor power of a household. This
labor power can have two different states: available and exhausted.
In the current version of the model, there is no other distinction be-
tween different labor powers from different households.
At the beginning of each period, all labor powers are available.
When a household works responding to the call of its employer, the
expend() method of its labor power is called. If the labor power of
the household is available at this moment, the labor power can be
expended: the state of the labor power change to exhausted. On
contrary, if the labor power is already exhausted when its method
expend() is called, then an error is generated that interrupts the sim-
ulation5. Thus, a labor power can be expended only once in a period.
3.1.2 Machines and production processes
A Machine object represents a machine, that is a unit of physical
capital. Each machine k is described by two parameters:
• dpk the production cycle time;
• prk the average productivity.
In the current version of the model, the production cycle time and the
average productivity of each machine are exogenous parameters.
In addition, each machine contains an object of type Production-
Process, that represents the production process associated to the ma-
chine. An object of type ProductionProcess encapsulate an integer
pk,t, that represents the progress of the production process.
Every time a household works — that is every time it is called to
expend its labor force onto a machine — the progress of the production
5This usually never happens, because a firm does not call an employed more than one
time by period. But if, by an error of programming, a firm try to call an employed twice,
the existence of this control will detect and block this violation of real sphere rules. So, we
are certain that each household can expend its labor power only once in a period. We see
that the data encapsulation within objects allows to model real constraints independently
from the implementation of the agents. As in the real world, this constraints are outside
of the agents.
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process associated to the machine is incremented6:
pk,t =
{
pk,t−1 + 1 if the machine k is activated,
pk,t−1 else.
(1)
As well as labor forces can be expended only once in a period, a pro-
duction progress can be incremented only one in a period. Requiring
several successive expenditures of labor power, the internal produc-
tion process of a machine spreads over several periods (at least equal
to dpk). In fact, this detail of the Machine object implementation is
an essential characteristic of the model that relates the real and the
monetary spheres; it is because production takes time that firms need
bank credit to finance production processes7.
When the process of production is completed, an object of type
Goods representing the new product is created. At period t, the volume
of production of the machine k is:
qk,t =
{
prkd
p
k if pk,t =d
p
k,
0 else.
(2)
The process of production is then cancelled. A new process will be
created when a household will expend its labor force on this machine.
3.1.3 Factory
A Factory object represents a factory, that is the department of the
firm in charge of the production. A Factory object is essentially com-
posed of a collection of machines. In the present version of the model,
the number of machines embedded in each factory is an exogenous
parameter8.
During the production phase, the firm transfers to the factory the
list of workers — agents of type household — employed by the firm.
6In the current version of the model, processes of production consume no raw material,
nor energy.
7See Keynes (1923 [1971]):
“During the lengthy process of production the business world is increasing out-
goings in terms of money — paying out in money for wages and other expenses
of production — in the expectation of recouping the outlay by disposing of
the product for money at a later date.” (Keynes 1923 [1971], p. 33)
8This hypothesis, justified only by the decreasing abstraction method, and destined to
be relaxed as soon as possible.
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As the number of workers can be lower than the number of machines
— either because the current level of production is lower than the full
capacity of production of the firm, or because some jobs offered on
the labor market remain vacant — the factory has to distribute the
available workforce onto existing machines.
We assume that the direction of the factory has for first goal to
terminate the current production processes before launching a new
one. For this purpose, machines are sorted by priority. The machines
whose processes of production are most advanced are prioritized. The
machines whose processes of production have the same state of progress
are sorted by decreasing productivity.
3.1.4 Commodities
An object of type Goods represents a heap of commodities. It asso-
ciates two properties, the quantity of commodities in the heap and
their total value. There is no difference of utility or quality between
commodities: all objects of type Goods represent different volumes of
the same consumption good.
Encapsulation of the volume and the value within the object Good
allows to define rigorously the conditions of creation and transfer of
these magnitudes. We have just seen how the volume of commodities
that is produced by a given machine is determined: by the repeated
expenditure of labor powers on this machine. The value of commodities
produced by a given machine equals to the sum of wages payed in the
process of production9.
3.2 Objects of monetary sphere
The objects of the monetary sphere represent the objects that play a
role in the creation and the circulation of money. The monetary sphere
comprises four classes of objects:
• the Account,
• the Deposit,
• the Loan,
• the Cheque.
9See Lavoie (2003, p. 151–152).
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3.2.1 Current account
An Account object represents the account of a non-bank agent — a
household or a firm — at the bank. An Account object is composed
of a money deposit and a list of loans.
3.2.2 Deposit
A Deposit object represents a money deposit of a non bank agent —
a household or a firm — at the bank. A Deposit object encapsulates
an integer that represents the amount of the deposit. This object is
endowed with one single method credit() that admits a parameter v.
A call to this method allows to increase the value of the deposit (credit
if v > 0) or to decrease it (debit if v < 0). The amount of a deposit
cannot be negative: if one tries to debit an amount higher than the
deposit amount, then an error is generated and the simulation breaks
off10.
The non bank agents have no direct access to the object Deposit
which is encapsulated within an object of type Account. Thus, an
agent cannot freely change the amount of the deposit, which is under
the protection of the bank. The bank is the only agent that can have
direct access to deposits and each agent must pass through the bank
for its monetary operations.
All the money in the model exists only as deposits: the money
supply equals the sum of the deposits of non bank agents.
3.2.3 Bank loans
A Loan object represents the debt of a non-bank agent to the bank11.
Each loan l encapsulates four parameters:
• rl the rate of interest;
• Ll the principal;
10Usually, an agent never goes to an expenditure without making sure that the required
sum is available on its account. Such an interruption of the simulation is a priori impossible
but the existence of this control guarantees that each agent complies with its monetary
constraint, independently from its implementation: an error of programming cannot lead
to an undue creation of money.
11In the current version of the model, the firms are the only agents to borrow. Nonethe-
less, nothing in the implementation of the monetary sphere stands in the way of the
construction of a model in which households (or other agents of another type) could also
have access to bank credit.
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• dl the due date;
• ql the loan quality.
When the bank lends to an agent, a new Loan object is created
for the loan amount and this amount is immediately credited on the
borrower deposit. In the same time, the Loan object is added at the
list of credits related to the borrower account.
Each month, at the end of the period, the bank goes through its
collection of loans. For each loan, the bank computes the amount of
the interest and debits the related deposit of this amount. For each
due loan, the due amount is debited from the borrower deposit and
the Loan object is cancelled.
Thus, each loan results in a creation of money and each repayment
results in destruction of money12.
3.2.4 Checks
The abstract class13 Check represents a written order to the bank
to pay a stated sum. A Check object encapsulates an integer that
represents an amount of the check. A Check object encapsulates an
integer that represents an amount of the check. Un objet de type
Cheque comprises an abstract method: transferTo().
Two concrete classes inherit from the abstract class check:
• A RegularCheck object represents a check from a non-bank agent;
• A BankCheck object represents a check from the bank.
The implementation of the method transferTo() depends on the type
of the check :
• When one calls the method transferTo() of a RegularCheck,
the amount of the check is credited to the account of the payee
agent and simultaneously debited from the account of the drawer
agent.
• When one calls the method transferTo() of a BankCheck, the
amount of the check is credited to the account of the payee agent
but no other account is debited.
12 See page 25.
13 In oriented-object programming, an abstract class is a class of objects that cannot be
instantiated, because its implementation is incomplete. An abstract class specifies com-
mon (abstract) methods that are to be implemented by specialized (concrete) descendent
classes.
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Regular checks, allowing to transfer money from a deposit to an
other, are the main means of payment used in the model. However,
in this model, a deposit represents a debt of the bank to a non-bank
agent. Since the bank cannot be indebted to itself, the bank cannot
hold money14 and when the bank makes a payment it is never a transfer
but a creation of money. For this reason, we have introduced bank
checks in the model.
4 Markets
Markets by themselves are neither autonomous agents, nor objects
subordinated to agents. Markets are the place where the different
agents get in touch.
Agent-based techniques allow to model two different kinds of mar-
kets: centralized markets as considered in the Walrassian approach, or
decentralized markets as in the real world. This is a fundamental con-
cern when implementing an agent-based model of an economic system.
Axtell (2005) shows how assumptions of centralized markets which are
the bases of general equilibrium theory lead to unrealistic conclusions.
“Walrasian markets in their Arrow-Debreu conception are
an ideal type, in the terminology of the philosophy of sci-
ence, a caricature of reality that abstracts from many de-
tails of real markets in order to provide a home for our
intuitions and a point of departure for deeper exploration
of market processes. Unfortunately, the embodiment of this
ideal type in [computable general equilibrium] software, es-
pecially when utilised for policy purposes, institutionalises
a series of propositions that more behaviourally realistic
and decentralised models reveal to be false, namely, that
markets do not disperse wealth, yield allocations that are
determined solely by preferences and endowments and are
not history-dependent.” (Axtell 2005, p. 209)
In this work, markets are modeled as places where agents meet in a
direct and decentralized way15. In a radical approach — following
14See page 22.
15See also Duménil and Lévy (1991): “We call this generalized adjustment in the mod-
eling of the behavior of economic agents “Disequilibrium Microeconomics.” In this frame-
work, the services of the auctioneer are not required. No agent computes any equilibrium
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Gintis (2006) — the informations about the markets the agents can
access are limited to a minimum.
“Rather than using analytically tractable but empirically
implausible adjustment mechanisms and informational as-
sumptions (such as Walrasian tâtonnement and prices as
public information), we treat the economy as complex sys-
tem in which agents have extremely limited information,
there is no aggregate price-adjustment mechanism institu-
tion, and out of equilibrium exchange occurs in every period
[. . . ] Agents in this economy have no knowledge of excess
demand or supply for any good. Nor is there an ‘auction-
eer’ (Walras 1954) calling out prices, collecting information
concerning aggregate demand, and dynamically ‘correcting’
the price structure, with the aim of moving the system to-
wards market clearing.” (Gintis 2006, p. 2-3)
4.1 Abstract market
The abstract class16 Market represents a market, i.e. an institution
that allows a collection of agents (offerors) to post offers and an other
collection of agents (seekers) to reply to theses offers. We assume that
markets proceed sequentially. At the sequence opening, offerors en-
ter the market and make offers which associate a monetary amount
to some real quantity. All offerers post their bids simultaneously and
independently (they have no knowledge of the offers of their competi-
tors).
The seekers enter the market successively in a random order. Each
seeker consults a limited number of offers and selects the one which
satisfies his objectives the most. The seeker deals directly with the
selected offeror. After each transaction, the situations of the offerer
and the seeker are considered. If the seeker is completely satisfied,
or if the offeror has nothing left to offer, then they are removed from
the market. The market sequence ends when one of the two lists
(offerors and seekers) is exhausted. It is unlikely that both lists exhaust
simultaneously: in most cases some agents remain unsatisfied.
In the current version of the model, this abstract definition of a
prices prior to the occurence of the market, and no auctioneer announces prices on the
market.”(Duménil and Lévy 1991, p. 372)
16See note 13, page 15.
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market is used in two concrete cases described in the following subsec-
tions.
4.2 Goods market
The concrete class GoodsMarket represents the market for goods. It
inherits methods and properties from the abstract Market class.
In the goods market, the set of firms constitutes the collection of
offerors while the set of households constitutes the list of seekers. Firms
enter the market as providers of goods. They offer a fixed quantity of
goods at a fixed price. The price is freely determined by the firms
before they post the bid: firms are price-makers. Thus, in a given
time period, the number of different prices (although there is only one
kind of good) may be as high as the total number of firms.
Households enter the market as purchasers of goods. Each con-
sumer has a fixed budget17 that he intends to spend entirely. To that
aim, he consults a limited number of offers randomly selected. The
probability for an offer to be selected in this process is proportional to
the volume of goods proposed in the offer18. The consumer systemati-
cally choose the best price among the selected offers. He deals directly
with the chosen provider and buys as many goods as possible within
the limits of his budget and of the volume proposed in the offer. If
the budget is exhausted by the deal, the consumer is removed from
the list of seekers in the considered sequence of the market. If the
volume offered is exhausted by the deal, the provider is removed from
the collection of offerors. Then a new consumer enters the process and
so on until either the total budget of all consumers or the total volume
of goods offered by providers are exhausted.
4.3 Labor market
The concrete class LaborMarket represents the labor market. It inher-
its methods and properties from the abstract Market class.
We have seen that, in our model of abstract market, the offeror is
the agent that posts an offer associating a price and a volume. Thus,
on the labor market as on the goods market, the offerors are the firms.
17We will see later how households fix the budget they intend to use for buying con-
sumption goods (see page 50).
18Weighted roulette wheel selection, see Chinneck (2006).
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In the labor market, the set of firms constitutes the collection of
offerors while the set of households constitutes the list of seekers. Firms
enter the market as employers. They offer a fixed number of jobs at a
fixed wage. The wage offered is freely determined by the firms before
they post the bid: firms are wage-makers. Thus, in a given time period,
the number of different wages offered (although there is only one kind
of job) may be as high as the total number of firms19.
Households enter the market as job seekers. Each job seeker decides
of its reservation wage20, i.e. the lowest wage which it will accepts a
job. The job seeker examines a limited number of offers21 and selects
the offer with the highest wage. If this wage is higher than its reserva-
tion wage, the job seeker is immediately recruited. If this wage is lower
than its reservation wage, the job seeker refuses the job and remains
jobless during the current period. Anyway, the jobseeker is removed
from the list of job seekers and another is selected for executing the
same procedure of job search. After each hiring, the employer updates
its offer. When all vacancies are filled, the employer is removed from
the list of employers.
The market is closed when one of the lists (employers or job seek-
ers) is exhausted. If the list of employers is the first to be exhausted,
this means that some job seekers will experience involuntary unem-
ployment. If the list of job seekers is the first to be exhausted, this
means that some employers will experience labor shortage.
5 Agents
The model contains three types of agents:
• the bank, which provides and manages the means of payment,
and distributes dividends to its shareholder,
• the firms, which borrow money, employ workers, produce and sell
goods, reimburse their credits, and distribute dividends;
• the households, which work, consume, and save.
19An other consequence is that several levels of wage coexist generally in one firm,
depending of the date of recruitment of the workers.
20We will see (page 48) how households determine this reservation wage.
21The offers examined are selected at random using the roulette wheel procedure: the
probability for an offer to be selected is proportional to the number of jobs offered.
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Agents differ from real and monetary objects and from markets as they
act in an autonomous way: they have their own goals and they make
decisions in order to achieve them.
5.1 A general design for agents behavior
Starting from the notions of procedural rationality (Simon 1996) and
reactive agent (Ferber 2006) we can develop a simple and realistic
scheme of the behavior of economic agents. This scheme is completely
compatible with post-Keynesian analysis.
“. . . we need only assume, in contrast to neoclassical the-
ory, a very limited amount of rationality on the part of
economic agents. Agents act on the basis of their budget
constraints. Otherwise, the essential rationality principle
is that of adjustment. Agents react to what they perceive
as disequilibria, or to the disequilibria that they take note
of, by making successive corrections. There is no need to
assume optimization, perfect information, rational expec-
tations, or generalized price-clearing mechanisms.” (Lavoie
and Godley 2001, p. 307-308)
In such behavioral models, stocks and inventories have a double role:
they make it possible to absorb shocks and they measure the degree
of disequilibrium the agent has to control.
“It is inventories on the one hand, and money stocks on the
other, which provide the essential flexible elements — the
‘buffers’ — which enable the whole system to function in a
world of uncertainty (. . . ) This ‘buffering’ does not merely
enable the system to function, it also generates a kind of
auto pilot whereby unexpected (and unwanted) stocks of
money and inventories result in a corrective mechanism
which comes into play during subsequent periods.” (Lavoie
and Godley 2001, p. 292)
On this basis, we define a set of guidelines for the modeling of the
agents’ behavior:
• At each point in time, the state of every agent is defined by a
given number of numerical variables (state variables). All agents
periodically adjust their behavior in order to reduce the gap (i.e.
the disequilibrium) between the value of their state variables and
the normal values for these variables.
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• They maintain stocks (real or monetary ones) which they can use
to cope with unexpected variations of their environment.
• Generally, they can act on the level of their stocks by increasing
or reducing their consumption of the respective resource.
• If such direct action is not possible, they use an indirect way by
acting on different variables which can have an influence on the
level of their stocks. In that case, as they do not know the exact
level of the required adjustment, they randomly decide whether
to adjust their behavior or not and the level of the adjustment
(within fixed bounds). The probability for an agent to decide
to adjust his behavior increases when the disequilibrium is large
(reaction to stress) and decreases when the level of the projected
adjustment is high (conservative behavior).
Thus we build reactive agents who use procedures combining oriented
search and trial and error methods. These procedures are very dif-
ferent from the Walrasian tâtonnement since agents do not have any
information about the general (macroeconomic) state of the market
and it is only through action that markets and market prices come
into being. The model is always in disequilibrium:
“In contrast to neo-classical economics, the adjustment pro-
cesses towards the steady state will be based on simple re-
action functions to disequilibria. There will be no need to
assume that firms maximize profit or that agents optimize
some utility function, nor will be any need to assume that
agents have perfect information or know perfectly how the
macroeconomic system behaves. In other words, there is no
need nor no room for the rational expectations hypothesis.
Still agents in our model are rational: they display a kind of
procedural rationality, sometimes misleadingly called weak
rationality or bounded rationality, or more appropriately
named reasonable rationality. They set themselves norms
and targets, and act in line with these and the expectations
that they may hold about the future. These norms, held by
agents, produce a kind of autopilot. Mistakes, or mistaken
expectations, bring about piled-up (or depleted) stocks —
real inventories, money balances, or wealth — that signal
a required change in behavior.” (Godley and Lavoie 2007,
p 16)
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5.2 Bank
In the model there is one bank represented by a Bank object. This ob-
ject represents the whole banking system. It is essentially constituted
by a list of accounts (Account objects) which are themselves made of a
monetary deposit and a list of credits. Thus, the Bank object controls
all credits and deposits contained in the model. Non-bank agents can-
not manipulate directly credits and deposits: they have to pass orders
to the bank.
5.2.1 Variables and parameters
As the unique representative of the whole banking system, the bank
is — in the current version of the model — rather an institution in
charge of managing the monetary sphere than a proper agent. The
behavior of the bank is extremely simple and its scope of action is
bound to maintain its capital at the normal level.
The state of the bank is defined by two variables : the sum of the
deposits of the non-bank agents (MB,t) and the sum of the loans of
the non-bank agents (LB,t) (table 1, page 23),
The behavior of the bank is defined by a set of exogenous param-
eters representing normal values (table 2, page 23). The bank acts
modifying the value of some variables that it controls directly (table 3,
page 23).
5.2.2 Bank capital
The bank capital (KB,t) is the excess of the total debt of the non-
banking sector over the total deposits of the non-banking sector. It
represents the net worth of the bank.
LB,t︸︷︷︸
Assets
= MB,t︸︷︷︸
Liabilities
+ KB,t︸︷︷︸
Net Worth
(3)
Lavoie emphasizes that the origin of the bank capital is twofold:
“It includes the funds initially put up by the owners of the
bank when starting business (how that initial fund came
about is rather mysterious however), plus the retained earn-
ings of the bank.” (Lavoie 2000, p. 8)
In the current version of the model, with a single bank that represents
the whole banking sector, the entire bank capital is formed by the
retained earnings of the bank. However, this capital is not money.
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LB,t the total outstanding loans.
MB,t the total deposits.
Table 1: State variables of the bank
rB the normal interest rate.
r ′B the penalty rate.
dB the normal term of a loan.
dˆB the maximal term of a loan.
κ∗B the normal capital adequacy ratio.
µKB the propensity to distribute the excess of capital.
Table 2: Normal values (exogenous) of the bank
K ∗B,t the capital stock targeted.
DB,t the dividend paid to the bank owner.
Table 3: Control variables of the bank
23
Because we have defined the money supply as the total deposits of
non-bank agents22, the bank cannot hold money. In our model, the
money is a debt for the bank, and the bank cannot be in debt to itself,
thus the bank capital is not money. On the contrary, it is the share
of bank profits that the owner of the bank cannot use as a means of
payment:
“The own capital of the bank constitutes a liability to itself.
It represents the funds which the firm owes to its owners. In
general, the own funds play a role similar to deposits that
would be in the hands of the owners. The own funds, just
like the deposits or the credits, are an accounting entry, but
in contrast to deposits, they cannot be drawn down by the
owners.” (Lavoie 2000, p. 8)
Before to be available as money, bank profits must be distributed as
dividends.
5.2.3 Dividends payment
The payment of dividends to the owner of the bank constitutes the
first phase of the period. This phase takes place between the time
(t + 07) and the time (t +
1
7) on the sequence diagram of the figure 1,
page 6.
Step 1: Observation The bank calculates the level of capital
targeted for the period (K ∗B,t). This objective is proportional to the
total assets of the bank.
K ∗B,t = κ
∗
BLB,t (4)
The ratio (κ∗B) is an exogenous parameter, that represents the liquidity
preference of the bank (Lavoie 2000, p. 8–9).
Step 2: Decision The bank examines the gap between the effec-
tive level of capital (KB,t+ 0
7
) and the targeted level (K ∗B,t). If the ef-
fective level is lower than the targeted level, no dividend is distributed.
If the effective level is higher than the targeted level, the bank decides
to distribute a share (µKB ) of the surplus as dividends (DB,t).
22See the description of the Deposit object, page 14.
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Step 3: Implementation The dividend is paid with a bank
check23. We have see that when a non-bank agent deposits a bank
check object on its account, there is an equivalent creation of money.
Then the bank seems to be endowed with an unlimited power of money
creation for the benefit of its owner. Nonetheless, this money creation
is only possible within the limits of the bank capital (KB,t+ 0
7
). Indeed,
when the bank pays a dividend (DB,t), the sum is deposited on the
account of the owner of the bank. Thus the total liabilities of the bank
are increased, while the total assets of the bank remain unchanged.
MB,t+ 1
7
= MB,t+ 0
7
+DB,t (5)
LB,t+ 1
7
= LB,t+ 0
7
(6)
Therefore, the bank capital is altered by this operation:
KB,t+ 1
7
= LB,t+ 1
7
−MB,t+ 1
7
= LB,t+ 0
7
− (MB,t+ 0
7
+DB,t)
= KB,t+ 0
7
−DB,t (7)
Thus, the dividends distributed by the bank are definitely debited from
the bank capital. We have seen that the bank stops to distribute div-
idends if its capital is lower than a fraction of its total assets. Indeed,
if the bank capital became negative — i.e. if the total liabilities ex-
ceeded the total assets — then the bank would be bankrupt and the
simulation would break off. Consequently, the dividends distributed
by the bank is always limited by the capital accumulated during the
previous periods.
5.2.4 Production financing
This phase takes place between the time (t+ 17) and the time (t+
2
7)
of the period t. The new loans, destined to finance the production,
are granted for a time period of dB months at the normal rate rB.
When financing the production, the bank is fully accommodating: it
satisfies the demand for credit by firms. The total amount of new
credits (NLB,t) does not depend on the willingness of the bank but
on the financial needs of the firms and is not limited by the level of
capital targeted by the bank:
23See the description of the BankCheck object, page 15.
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“[. . . ] at the very moment in time when a new loan has been
granted, the bank is in a more risky position. This situa-
tion is however only a temporary one. For the larger stock
of loans and deposits will allow the bank to rake up addi-
tional net interest revenues (unless the new loans are being
defaulted in unusual proportions) [. . . ] These additional
revenues, when they are due and integrated to the retained
earnings, will thus bring the [asset to own funds] ratio back
to its initial level. At the end of the year, the balance sheet
of the bank has increased in size, but the liquidity pref-
erence of the bank may remain the same.” (Lavoie 2000,
p. 10)
The total amount of new loans (NLB,t) added to the total out-
standing debt of non-bank agents is equal to the rise of total deposits
of non-bank agents24.
LB,t+ 2
7
= LB,t+ 1
7
+ NLB,t (8)
MB,t+ 3
7
= MB,t+ 2
7
+ NLB,t (9)
We easily show that this phase does not alter the capital of the bank.
KB,t+ 3
7
= LB,t+ 3
7
−MB,t+ 3
7
= (LB,t+ 2
7
+ NLB,t)− (MB,t+ 2
7
+ NLB,t)
= LB,t+ 2
7
−MB,t+ 2
7
= KB,t+ 2
7
(10)
We observe that there is no budget constraint that limits the amount of
new loans. In accordance with the endogenous money theory, “credits
make deposits”.
“An agent opening a bank deposit doesn’t lose his own liq-
uidity, since he is usually able to make use of his deposit as
a means of payment at any moment and without notice. At
the same time a bank, when making a new loan, is granting
additional liquidity without subtracting any liquidity from
any of its own depositors. therefor, as Hawtrey concluded,
when a bank makes a loan to a customer, it is not transmit-
ting liquidity from one agent to another one but creating
new liquidity [. . . ] ” (Graziani 2003, p. 82–83)
24See the description of the Loan object, page 14.
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5.2.5 Payment management
The next phases — from the time (t + 37) to the time (t +
5
7) of the
period t — involve firms and households in the processes of produc-
tion and consumption of goods. During these phases that involve real
and monetary transactions, the bank just plays the role of a payment
agent (payment of wages and consumption expenditures). In this role,
the bank has no autonomy: it simply processes money transfers or-
ders from non-bank agents, as long as their accounts have a positive
balance.
Each time a non-bank agent directs a payment to another non-bank
agent, its account is debited with the corresponding amount while the
payee account is credited with the same amount. The total deposits is
not altered by this operation and the bank capital remains unchanged.
5.2.6 Interest payment
At the end of the period, the bank attempts to obtain the interest
payment on the debts. This phase takes place between the time (t+ 57)
and the time (t+ 67) of the period t.
For each outstanding loan, the bank calculates the interest due.
The interest is directly debited from the borrower’s account.
MB,t+ 6
7
= MB,t+ 5
7
− INTPB,t (11)
Thus the interest payment results in an equal reduction in the total
liabilities of the bank.
When a debtor cannot pay the interest due, the bank is always
accommodating: the unpaid interest due are added to the principal
amount of the debtor debt, increasing the total assets of the bank.
LB,t+ 6
7
= LB,t+ 5
7
+ INTNPB,t (12)
Either debited from the borrower’s account or added to its outstanding
debt, the interest increases immediately the capital of the bank.
KB,t+ 6
7
= LB,t+ 6
7
−MB,t+ 6
7
= (LB,t+ 5
7
+ INTNPB,t)− (MB,t+ 5
7
− INTPB,t)
= KB,t+ 5
7
+ INTNPB,t + INT
P
B,t (13)
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5.2.7 Repayment of loans
Then the bank attempts to recover the debts due. This phase takes
place between the time (t+ 67) and the time (t+
7
7) of the period t.
Normally, the borrowers have enough money to repay the bank.
As for the interest payment, the debt repayment process is initiated
by the bank which debits the due amounts (RLB,t) directly from the
accounts of the borrowers. But as for the interest payment, sometimes
some borrowers does not have enough money to repay the bank at the
due date. In this case, the behavior of the bank depends on the quality
of the loan:
goodDebt : When a borrower is unable to repay at the due date dB
a loan rated goodDebt , the bank automatically grants him more
time: the credit term change from dB to dˆB; the quality of the
loan is downgraded to doubtfulDebt ;
doubtfulDebt : At the end of each period, the bank attempts to re-
cover, even partially, the loans rated doubtfulDebt without wait-
ing the term. If at the term dˆB the borrower is unable to re-
pay a loan rated doubtfulDebt , the bank reduces the borrower to
bankruptcy.
On the asset side of the bank balance sheet, bankruptcies result in
the cancellation of all debts (NPLB,t) of the bankrupt agents.
MB,t+ 7
7
= MB,t+ 6
7
− RLB,t (14)
LB,t+ 7
7
= LB,t+ 6
7
− RLB,t −NPLB,t (15)
While the normal repayment of loans (RLB,t) does not alter the capital
of the bank, the debt cancellation (NPLB,t) results in an equivalent
destruction of bank capital25.
KB,t+ 7
7
= LB,t+ 7
7
−MB,t+ 7
7
= (LB,t+ 6
7
− RLB,t −NPLB,t)− (MB,t+ 6
7
− RLB,t)
= LB,t+ 6
7
−MB,t+ 6
7
−NPLB,t
= KB,t+ 6
7
−NPLB,t (16)
25“[The own funds] would be reduced whenever a borrower defaults on a loan. In that
case, a similar amount would be deducted from the loan assets and the own funds liabilities
when the bad loans need to be written off (i.e., when the accountants of the bank consider
that the borrowers are unable to service the interest payments on their loan and are unable
to ever pay back the loan).” (Lavoie 2000, p. 7)
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If KB,t+ 7
7
< 0, the bank capital is insufficient to cover the bankruptcy
of the debtor and the bank itself goes bankrupt26. Since in the current
version of the model the bank is a unique bank that represents the
whole banking sector, the crisis is systemic and the simulation breaks
off.
5.3 Firms
A firm is represented by a Firm object. This object is essentially com-
posed of Factory object, i.e. a collection of machines27, and a Payroll
object, i.e. a list of employees together with their labor contract.
In each period, a firm decides about its production plan and asks
the bank to finance this plan. The firm takes on labor, pays wages,
produces and offers its production on the market of goods. It repays
the debts due and pays a share of its profits to its owner.
Most of these actions require non-trivial decisions28:
• How much to produce?
• What price to charge?
• What wage to offer?
• How much profits to retain for production financing and how
much distribute?
The behavior of the firms is modeled as a sequence of simple ad-
justment procedures. The state of a given firm is defined by a set of
variables (table 4 page 30). The firm compares the value of some of
these variables with a set of normal values shared by all the firms of the
sector which are exogenous parameters (table 5 page 31). Depending
on the gap between these state variables and the normal values, the
firm adjusts its control variables (table 6 page 31) upward or down-
ward.
26“When there is too large a proportion of bad loans, own funds, i.e., the net worth of
the bank, can become negative, in which case the bank becomes insolvent.” (Lavoie 2000,
p. 7)
27See the description the Factory object, page 12.
28See Godley and Lavoie (2007, p. 2): “Rejecting as chimerical the concept of the neo-
classical production function, post-Keynesians hold that, in an uncertain world, firms,
operating under conditions of imperfect competition and increasing returns, must decide
how much to produce and how many workers to employ, what prices to charge, how much
to invest, and how to obtain finance.”
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infii,t the volume of inventory of the firm (finished goods only).
IN i,t the total value of inventories of the firm (finished and unfinished
goods).
pˆr i,t the average monthly production of the firm at full capacity uti-
lization (equal to the sum of the monthly productivities pk of the
machines owned by the firm).
ρi,t the job vacancy rate on the last three months.
wi,t the effective workforce (the number of workers employed by the
firm).
wˆi,t the workforce required at full capacity utilization (equal to the num-
ber of machines owned by the firm).
Mi,t the available balance of the firm (equal to the amount of money on
its bank account).
Li,t the debt of the firm.
Table 4: State variables of the firm i
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dwF the labour contract lenght.
κ∗F the normal capital to asset ratio.
in∗F the normal level of inventory (finished goods), as un
number of periods of production at full capacity utiliza-
tion.
ρ∗F the normal ratio of vacancies.
W¯F the legal minimum wage.
νPF the monthly maximal flexibility of the price of goods.
νwF the monthly maximal flexibility of the level of produc-
tion, as a percentage of the full capacity utilisation.
νWupF the monthly maximal upward flexibility of the wage of-
fered.
νWdownF the monthly maximal downward flexibility of the wage
offered.
µKF the propensity to distribute the excess of capital.
µinF the propensity to offer for sale the commodities in in-
ventory.
λF the ratio marketing capacity to production capacity.
Table 5: Normal (exogenous) values of the firms sector
w∗i,t the level of production decided (the number of posts).
Wi,t the wage offered.
Pi,t the price offered.
sa∗i ,t the quantity of commodities offered.
Di,t the amount of the dividends to pay to the owner.
Table 6: Control variables of the firm i
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5.3.1 Dividends payment
For a firm, the payment of the dividends to its owner constitutes the
first phase of the period. This phase takes place between the time
(t + 17) and the time (t +
2
7) on the sequence diagram of the figure 1,
page 6.
We define a procedure based on the adjustment principle, the pay-
ment of the dividend (Di,t) enabling to control the level of capital of
the firm.
Step 1 : Observation The firm begins by calculating the amount
of its own capital — formed by the earnings retained during the pre-
vious periods. The value of its inventory of finished and unfinished
goods (IN i,t+ 1
7
) is accounted on the assets side of the balance sheet
of the firm, together with the value of its money deposit at the bank
(Mi,t+ 1
7
). The value of the debt (Li,t+ 1
7
) and the own capital (Ki,t+ 1
7
)
are accounted on the liabilities side of the balance sheet of the firm.
IN i,t+ 1
7
+Mi,t+ 1
7︸ ︷︷ ︸
Assets
= Li,t+ 1
7
+ Ki,t+ 1
7︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liabilities and owner’s equity
(17)
Thus:
Ki,t+ 1
7
= IN i,t+ 1
7
+Mi,t+ 1
7
− Li,t+ 1
7
(18)
Then the firm determines the own capital targeted for the period (K ∗i,t).
This target is proportional to the total assets.
K ∗i,t = κ
∗
F (IN i,t+ 1
7
+Mi,t+ 1
7
) (19)
Step 2 : Proposition The firm examines the gap between the
effective level of own capital (Ki,t+ 1
7
) and the targeted level (K ∗i,t).
If the effective level is lower than the targeted level, no dividend is
distributed. If the effective level is higher than the targeted level, the
accounting department of the firm proposes to distribute a share (µKF )
of the surplus as dividends (D˜i,t).
D˜i,t =
{
0 si Ki,t+ 1
7
−K ∗i,t ≤ 0,
µKF (Ki,t+ 1
7
−K ∗i,t) sinon.
(20)
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Step 3 : Decision The firm accepts the proposition of the account-
ing department, under the limit of the amount of money available on
its account at this time (Mi,t+ 1
7
).
Di,t =
{
D˜i,t if D˜i,t ≤Mi,t+ 1
7
Mi,t+ 1
7
else.
(21)
Step 4 : Payment The dividend is paid by a check.
Mi,t+ 2
7
= Mi,t+ 1
7
−Di,t (22)
The dividend paid is debited from the own capital of the firm.
Ki,t+ 2
7
= IN i,t+ 2
7
+Mi,t+ 2
7
− Li,t+ 2
7
= IN i,t+ 1
7
+ (Mi,t+ 1
7
−Di,t)− Li,t+ 1
7
= (IN i,t+ 1
7
+Mi,t+ 1
7
− Li,t+ 1
7
)−Di,t
= Ki,t+ 1
7
−Di,t (23)
5.3.2 Production and employ determination
Then the firms have to decide about their level of production. This
phase takes place between the time (t+ 17) and the time (t+
2
7) of the
period.
Because of the complexity of the system and because of the agents’
uncertainty with regard to the future the firms do not have any in-
formation about the general supply and demand conditions they are
facing.
“When the decision to produce is made, demand on the
next market is, in fact, unknown. A classical-inspired con-
struction would have agents estimate demand using the
knowledge of disequilibrium in the present.” (Duménil and
Lévy 1987, p. 142)
Moreover, because the market economy is decentralized, we have de-
cided that firms cannot have access to any information on the previous
states of the aggregate supply and demand29. The firm has to build
its own representation of the current state of the supply and the de-
mand from its personal experience. Because inventories are used as
29The description of the markets, page 16. Thus there is two levels of uncertainty in the
model:
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buffers to damp unexpected disequilibria between supply and demand
at the firm level, their state plays an essential role in the production
decision30.
“This difference between supply and demand is equal, for
accounting reasons, to the size of the new stock of inven-
tories. In a decentralised economy, each enterprise is igno-
rant of the general industrial situation concerning supply
and demand. Therefore, the degree of stockpiling, as expe-
rienced by individual sellers in the movement of their own
inventories, is one of the best indicators of disequilibrium.”
(Duménil and Lévy 1987, p. 137)
Each firm determines its level of production by deciding the work-
force to employ. We define a procedure based upon the principle of
adjustment31: the number of employees targeted (w∗i,t) is determined
• an endogenous uncertainty, resulting from the complexity of the economy modeled,
that forbids the access to future data (individual or aggregated),
• an exogenous uncertainty, resulting from our radical approach of market economies,
that prohibits the access to past or present aggregated data.
The prohibition of access to past or present aggregated data is only a working hypothesis
that we can drop at anytime, while the impossibility of access to future individual or
aggregated data is an essential property of the model.
30See Godley and Lavoie (2007):
“Firms hold a buffer of finished goods, which can be called upon whenever
demand exceeds production. Sales are always equal to demand because it is
assumed that inventories are always large enough to absorb any discrepancy
between production and demand. In this approach it is necessary to track the
evolution of inventories from period to period, and to pay meticulous attention
to the way in which they are measured, in particular to how they are valued.”
(Godley and Lavoie 2007, p. 64-65)
See also Cyert and March (2003):
“In most models of ouput determination, we introduce expectations with re-
spect to future sales and relate output to such predictions. Our studies indi-
cates, to the contrary, that organizations use only gross expectations about
future sales in the output decision. They may, and frequently do, forecast
sales and develop some long-run production plans on paper, but the actual
production decisions are more frequently dominated by day-to-day and week-
to-week feedback data from inventory, recent sales, and sales staff.” (Cyert and
March 2003, p. 167)
31See the description of the general design of the agent behavior, page 20.
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by an upward or downward variation (δwi,t) of the previous number of
employees targeted (w∗i,t−1).
Step 1: Observation The department of production of the firm
calculates the normal level of inventories (i.e. the quantity of finished
goods in∗i,t). This level is a multiple of the average production of the
firm at the full capacity of production.
in∗i,t = in
∗
F .pˆr i,t (24)
This normal level is compared to the effective level of the inventories
(finished goods) observed at this time (infi
i,t+ 2
7
).
Step 2: Proposition If the production department detects a dis-
equilibrium (if in∗i,t 6= infii,t+ 2
7
) it proposes to the firm management an
adjustment of the employed workforce (δ˜wi,t). To determine the ori-
entation of the adjustment, the firm considers the gap between the
effective level of inventories at this time and the normal level of inven-
tories (infi
i,t+ 2
7
− in∗i,t).
An effective level that is lower than the normal level is interpreted
as a sign of excess demand and leads the production department to
put forward a rise in the level of employment. Conversely an effective
level that is higher than the normal level is interpreted as a sign of
excess supply and leads the production department to put forward a
cut in the level of employment. The scale of the adjustment is chosen
at random in the interval [0, νwF ].
δ˜wi,t =
{
ανwF if in
fi
i,t+ 2
7
− in∗i,t < 0,
−ανwF else.
(25)
The variable α is a random variable determined at each use on a uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1].
Step 3: Decision The production department submits its propo-
sition of adjustment to the firm management, which accepts or rejects
it.
δwi,t =
δ˜
w
i,t si αβ <
∣∣∣∣∣ in
fi
i,t+27
−in∗i,t
in∗i,t
∣∣∣∣∣,
0 sinon.
(26)
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The variable β is a random variable determined at each use on a uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1].
One can see that the higher α is high — i.e. the more significant
is the proposed adjustment — the higher is the probability for the
adjustment to be rejected is high. Conversely, more the disequilib-
rium observed is high, more the probability for the adjustment to be
accepted is high.
Step 4: Adjustment of the target The firm adjusts its target
of workforce (w∗i,t), within the limits of the interval [0, wˆi,t] defined by
the production capacity of the firm.
w∗i,t =

0 if (1 + δwi,t)w
∗
i,t−1 < 0,
wˆi,t if (1 + δwi,t)w
∗
i,t−1 > wˆi,t,
(1 + δwi,t)w
∗
i,t−1 else.
(27)
Step 5: Implementation When its workforce target (w∗i,t) is
determined, the firm compares this target with the effective number
of employees at this time (wi,t+ 2
7
). If a workforce surplus is detected
(if w∗i,t < wi,t+ 2
7
), the firm lays off the excess employees immediately;
then the most recently hired workers are the first laid off (“Last in
first out”). On the contrary, if the firm observes a lack of workforce (if
w∗i,t > wi,t+ 2
7
), the firm will have to hire new workers.
5.3.3 Pricing
Immediately after the determination of the level of production — but
still between the time (t + 27) and the time (t +
3
7) of the period t
— each firm determines the price level at which the product will be
offered on the goods market.
According to Lavoie (2004, p. 44), all post-Keynesian models are
based upon the principle of prices determined by cost-plus pricing.
Deliberately, we move away on this point from post-Keynesian models
for defining a procedure more closer to the classical framework:
“In the classical framework, price adjustments follow the ob-
servation of actual disequilibrium between supply and de-
mand (to a degree which varies according to circumstances,
as mentioned by Smith in the above quotation) on markets
which do not clear.”(Duménil and Lévy 1987, p. 137)
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So, as for the determination of the level of production, the firms base
their pricing decision on the observation of the level of inventories32.
We define a procedure based on the adjustment principle: the new
price (Pi,t) is determined by an upward or downward variation (δPi,t) of
the previous price (Pi,t−1).
Step 1: Observation As for the procedure of determination of
the production level, the price department measure the gap between
the effective level of its inventory of finished goods(infi
i,t+ 2
7
) and the
normal level (in∗i,t).
Step 2: Proposition If a disequilibrium is detected, an adjust-
ment of the price (δ˜Pi,t) is proposed. An effective level lower than the
normal level is interpreted as the sign of the excess of demand over
supply and leads the price department to put forward a rise in the
price. Inversely an effective level higher than the normal level is in-
terpreted as a sign of the excess of supply over demand and leads the
price department to put forward a cut in the price. The scale of the
adjustment is chosen at random in the interval [0, νPF ].
δ˜Pi,t =
{
ανPF if in
fi
i,t+ 2
7
− in∗i,t < 0,
−ανPF else.
(28)
The variable α is a random variable determined at each use on a uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1].
Step 3: Decision The price department submits its proposition
of adjustment to the firm management, which accepts or rejects it.
δPi,t =
δ˜
P
i,t if αβ <
∣∣∣∣∣ in
fi
i,t+27
−in∗i,t
in∗i,t
∣∣∣∣∣,
0 else.
(29)
The variable β is a random variable determined at each use on a uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1].
32We drop this hypothesis in Seppecher (2010b) and Seppecher (2010c).
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Step 4: Adjustment of the price Then the firm adjusts its
price.
Pi,t = (1 + δ
P
i,t)Pi,t−1 (30)
The new price is the price at which the product will be offered on the
goods market during the sales phase.
5.3.4 Wage determination
Then each firm determines the wage it will offer on the labor mar-
ket. We define a procedure based on the adjustment principle: the
new wage offered is determined by an upward or downward variation
(δWi,t ) of the previous price (Wi,t−1). The adjustment of the wage is
eventually limited by the legal minimum wage (W¯F ).
Step 1: Observation The human resources manager of the firm
begins by calculating the rate of vacancies observed during the last 4
previous months (ρi,t). Then it measure the gap between this rate and
the normal rate of vacancies (ρ∗F ).
Step 2: Proposition If a disequilibrium is detected, an adjust-
ment of the wage offered (δ˜Wi,t ) is proposed. An effective level lower
than the normal level is interpreted as a sign of excess demand of jobs
over and leads the human resources manager to put forward a cut in
the wage offered. Conversely an effective level higher than the nor-
mal level is interpreted as a sign of excess supply of jobs and leads
the human resources manager to put forward a cut in the wage of-
fered. The scale of the adjustment is chosen at random in the interval
[−νWdownF , 0] (downward adjustment) or in the interval [0, νWupF ] (up-
ward adjustment).
δ˜Wi,t =
{
−ανWdownF if ρi,t − ρ∗F < 0,
ανWupF else.
(31)
The variable α is a random variable determined at each use on a uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1].
Step 3: Decision The human resources manager submits its propo-
sition of adjustment to the firm management, which accepts or rejects
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it.
δWi,t =
{
δ˜Wi,t if αβ <
∣∣∣ρi,t−ρ∗Fρ∗F ∣∣∣,
0 else.
(32)
The variable β is a random variable determined at each use on a uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1].
Step 4: Adjustment of wages Then the firm adjusts the wage
offered, within the limit fixed by the legal minimum wage (W¯F ).
Wi,t =
{
(1 + δWi,t )Wi,t−1 if (1 + δ
W
i,t )Wi,t−1 > W¯F ,
W¯F else.
(33)
The new wage is the wage at which the vacancies will be offered on
the labor market during the recruitment phase.
5.3.5 Borrowing
Then the firms have to finance the production process. This phase
constitutes the transition between the state (t+ 27) and the state (t+
3
7)
of the model.
Since the wage offered is now determined, the accounting manager
of the firm can estimate the wage bill (WB∗i,t) it will pay if all vacancies
are filled. The accounting manager compares this estimation with its
available balance (Mi,t+ 2
7
) to calculate its need for external financing
(NL∗i,t). If the available balance is higher than the anticipated wage
bill then the firm does not need external financing. On the contrary, if
the available balance is lower than the anticipated wage bill then the
firm seeks external financing.
NL∗i,t =
{
0 if Mi,t+ 2
7
≥WB∗i,t,
WB∗i,t −Mi,t+ 2
7
else.
(34)
We have seen33 that the bank is, in this circumstance, fully accommo-
dating: it grants a new loan for an amount (NLi,t) equal to the need
of financing expressed by the firm.
NLi,t = NL
∗
i,t (35)
Li,t+ 3
7
= Li,t+ 2
7
+ NLi,t (36)
33See the description of the behavior of the bank when financing the production, page 25.
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The available balance of the firm is increased by the new loan.
Mi,t+ 3
7
= Mi,t+ 2
7
+ NLi,t (37)
Nonetheless, the own capital of the firm remains unchanged.
Ki,t+ 3
7
= IN i,t+ 3
7
+Mi,t+ 3
7
− Li,t+ 3
7
= IN i,t+ 2
7
+ (Mi,t+ 2
7
+ NLi,t)− (Li,t+ 2
7
+ NLi,t)
= IN i,t+ 2
7
+Mi,t+ 2
7
− Li,t+ 2
7
= Ki,t+ 2
7
(38)
5.3.6 Workforce recruitment
The firm has now money available to pay the targeted workforce (w∗i,t).
If the number of workers effectively employed is lower than the targeted
workforce, the firm tries to recruit new workers. In this case, the firm
posts on the labor market an offer stating the number of vacancies
(equal to w∗i,t − wi,t+ 2
7
) and the wage offered (Wi,t). The firm hires
the households who respond to its offer, in order of arrival. If the
number of applicants is lower than the number of jobs offered, some
jobs remain unfilled34.
Each hire results in a specific labor contract that attaches the em-
ployee to the firm. The duration of the contract is selected at random
in the interval dwF . The wage is the wage offered (Wi,t) and is fixed the
contract duration. The contract can be breached at any time by the
firm if it decides to reduce the level of production.
5.3.7 Production
When the workforce is recruited, the firm can pass to the phase of
production. This phase constitutes the transition between the state
(t+ 37) and the state (t+
4
7) of the model.
This phase begins with the payment of wages to the workers em-
ployed by the firm35. The firm traverses the list of its employees (a
Payroll object) and gives to each employee a check over the con-
tracted amount. The sum of these checks forms the total wage bill of
34See the description of the labor market, page 18.
35The firm has to pay the workers before employing them on machines because house-
holds refuse to work if they do not perceive a wage in the current period. See the note
46, page 50.
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the period (WB i,t).
Mi,t+ 4
7
= Mi,t+ 3
7
−WB i,t (39)
As the firm has calculated its need of external finance in order to cover
exactly the cost of the workforce for the current period, its available
balance after the payment of the wage bill is normally equal to zero.
However, it is possible that the firm does not reach its recruitment
target; in this case, the money reserved to the payment of the lacking
workers remains unused on the firm account.
In return for the wages the firm consumes the labor power of its
employees in the process of production. The firm transfers the payroll
to its factory, the factory employs these workers on the machines and
the production process progresses36.
Because production takes time, the product is not available im-
mediately — it is an unfinished good. The product exits the factory
under the form of a volume of finished goods only at the end of a
process that takes several periods37. Thus the payment of the wage
bill (WB i,t) results in an increase of the value of the unfinished goods
inventory (IN uni,t ).
If one ore more production processes come to the end, there is
production of some quantity of finished goods, i.e. of commodities.
The volume of the commodities produced (yi,t) is determined by the
productivity of the machines used while the value of the commodities
produced (Yi,t) is equal to the sum of the wages paid for the progress
of the related processes of production. The finished goods produced in
the period are added to the inventory of the firm, to the commodities
produced during the previous periods but still unsold.
infi
i,t+ 4
7
= infi
i,t+ 3
7
+ yi,t (40)
IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
= IN fi
i,t+ 3
7
+ Yi,t (41)
The value of the inventory of unfinished goods (IN uni,t ) undergoes two
opposite movements: it is increased by the payment of wages (WB i,t)
36See the description of the objects of the real sphere, page 9.
37However, because several production processes are normally in progress with differ-
ent advancements the act to produce and the availability of the product seems generally
simultaneous. On the other hand, when there is a change in the level of production, the
duration of the production cycle by a delay in the change of the production of finished
goods.
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and reduced by the value of the commodities produced.
IN un
i,t+ 4
7
= IN un
i,t+ 3
7
+ WB i,t −Yi,t (42)
The value of the commodities produced (Yi,t) does not affect the total
value of the inventories of the firm (IN t+ 4
7
), but is simply transferred
from the inventory of unfinished goods to the inventory of finished
goods.
IN t+ 4
7
= IN fi
t+ 4
7
+ IN un
t+ 4
7
= (IN fi
i,t+ 3
7
+ Yi,t) + (IN
un
i,t+ 3
7
+ WB i,t −Yi,t)
= IN fi
i,t+ 3
7
+ IN un
i,t+ 3
7
+ WB i,t
= IN t+ 3
7
+ WB i,t (43)
Thus, the increase of the total value of inventories during the produc-
tion phase is equal to the wage bill (WB i,t).
The payment of the wage bill in the production process results for
the capital of the firm in two opposite movements which exactly offset
each other.
Ki,t+ 4
7
= IN i,t+ 4
7
+Mi,t+ 4
7
− Li,t+ 4
7
= (IN i,t+ 3
7
+ WB i,t) + (Mi,t+ 3
7
−WB i,t)− Li,t+ 3
7
= IN i,t+ 3
7
+Mi,t+ 3
7
− Li,t+ 3
7
= Ki,t+ 3
7
(44)
Thus, the capital of the firm remains a constant during the production
phase, but we observe a change in its composition with a transfer
of value from the money-form to the commodity-form for an amount
equal to the wage bill.
5.3.8 Sales
When the production phase is finished, the firm attempts to sell the
product on the goods market. This phase constitutes the transition
between the state (t+ 47) and the state (t+
5
7) of the model.
We suppose that the firm tries to sell the maximum of goods with
two constraints:
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• As the firm uses its inventory to damp variation of production
and demand, it never sells more then a fraction of the available
volume of commodities (infi
i,t+ 4
7
).
• The marketing capacity of a firm is limited to a multiple (λF ) of
its production capacity (pˆr i,t).
The volume of commodities that the firm offers on the goods market
(sa∗i ,t) is defined by these two constraints.
sa∗i ,t =
{
µinF in
fi
i,t+ 4
7
if µinF in
fi
i,t+ 4
7
< λF pˆr i,t,
λF pˆr i,t else.
(45)
The firm posts its offer on the goods market38. This offer contains
two informations: the volume of goods offered (sa∗i ,t) and the unit
price (Pi,t). In return for this offer, customers (households) express
a demand for some quantity of goods. The firm satisfies all these
demands in the limit of the volume offered (sa∗i ,t) and deposits the
cheques received in payment.
The effective volume of sales (sai,t) — possibly lower to the volume
offered sa∗i ,t — determines the new state of the inventory of commodi-
ties (infi
i,t+ 5
7
).
infi
i,t+ 5
7
= infi
i,t+ 4
7
− sai,t (46)
The value of commodities in inventory (infi
i,t+ 5
7
) is reduced in propor-
tion of the reduction of the volume of this inventory.
IN fi
i,t+ 5
7
= IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
− sai,t
infi
i,t+ 4
7
IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
(47)
The proceeds of the sales (sai,tPi,t) determines the new state of the
available balance (Mi,t+ 5
7
).
Mi,t+ 5
7
= Mi,t+ 4
7
+ sai,tPi,t (48)
The capital of the firm undergoes two opposite and simultaneous move-
ments: the first is negative and caused by the diminution of the value
38See the description of the goods market, page 18.
43
of the inventory while the second is positive and caused by the aug-
mentation of the available balance.
Ki,t+ 5
7
= IN i,t+ 5
7
+Mi,t+ 5
7
− Li,t+ 5
7
= (IN fi
i,t+ 5
7
+ IN un
i,t+ 5
7
) +Mi,t+ 5
7
− Li,t+ 5
7
= IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
− sai,t
infi
i,t+ 4
7
IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
+ IN un
i,t+ 4
7
+Mi,t+ 4
7
+ sai,tPi,t − Li,t+ 4
7
= (IN i,t+ 4
7
+Mi,t+ 4
7
− Li,t+ 4
7
)− sai,t
infi
i,t+ 4
7
IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
+ sai,tPi,t
= Ki,t+ 4
7
− sai,t
infi
i,t+ 4
7
IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
+ sai,tPi,t (49)
While the phase of production results in a transformation of money-
capital into commodity-capital, the phase of sales results in an inverse
transformation of commodity-capital in money-capital. However, be-
cause there is no reason to the proceeds of the sales to be equal to
the value of the commodities sold, the firm capital undergoes a change
between the time (t+ 47) and the time (t+
5
7). This change constitutes
the total profit (or the loss) of the firm in the period (FTi,t).
FTi,t = Ki,t+ 5
7
−Ki,t+ 4
7
= − sai,t
infi
i,t+ 4
7
IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
+ sai,tPi,t
= sai,t
Pi,t − IN fii,t+ 47
infi
i,t+ 4
7
 (50)
In order for the firm to realize profits, the unit price (Pi,t) must be
higher than the unit cost of the commodities sold (UC i,t+ 4
7
).
UC i,t+ 4
7
=
IN fi
i,t+ 4
7
infi
i,t+ 4
7
(51)
In others words, the margin (ϕi,t) of the price (Pi,t) over the unit cost
(UC i,t+ 4
7
) must be positive.
ϕi,t =
Pi,t −UC i,t+ 4
7
UC i,t+ 4
7
(52)
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FTi,t = sai,t(Pi,t −UC i,t+ 4
7
)
= sai,tϕi,tUC i,t+ 4
7
(53)
5.3.9 Payment of interest
After the goods market has closed, the firm has to pay the interests
to the bank. This phase constitutes the transition between the state
(t + 57) and the state (t +
6
7) of the model. The bank debits directly
the amount of interest payment (INT i,t) from the account of the firm
39. The firm has no autonomy in this phase.
Mi,t+ 6
7
= Mi,t+ 5
7
− INT i,t (54)
We have seen that when a debtor agent is unable to pay the interest
due, the bank is always accommodating. In such a case, the debt
of the firm is simply increased by the amount of the unpaid interest
(INTNPi,t ).
Li,t+ 6
7
= Li,t+ 5
7
+ INTNPi,t (55)
No matter if the interest is debited from the account of the firm or if its
effective payment is delayed, the corresponding amount is immediately
deducted from the capital of the firm.
Ki,t+ 6
7
= IN i,t+ 6
7
+Mi,t+ 6
7
− Li,t+ 6
7
= IN i,t+ 5
7
+ (Mi,t+ 5
7
− INT i,t)− (Li,t+ 5
7
+ INTNPi,t )
= (IN i,t+ 5
7
+Mi,t+ 5
7
− Li,t+ 5
7
)− (INT i,t + INTNPi,t )
= Ki,t+ 5
7
− (INT i,t + INTNPi,t ) (56)
5.3.10 Repayment of loans and bankruptcies
Next, the firm has to pay back the loans due (RLi,t). This phase takes
place between the time (t+ 67) and the time (t+
7
7) of the period t.
Again, the firm has no autonomy and the bank debits directly the
amount due from account of the firm.
Mi,t+ 7
7
= Mi,t+ 6
7
− RLi,t (57)
39See the description of the payment of the interest from the point of view of the bank,
page 27.
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The outstanding debt of the firm is reduced by the corresponding
amount.
Li,t+ 7
7
= Li,t+ 6
7
− RLi,t (58)
This equal and simultaneous reduction of the debt and the deposit of
the firm leaves its capital unchanged.
Ki,t+ 7
7
= IN i,t+ 7
7
+Mi,t+ 7
7
− Li,t+ 7
7
= IN i,t+ 6
7
+ (Mi,t+ 6
7
− RLi,t)− (Li,t+ 6
7
− RLi,t)
= IN i,t+ 6
7
+Mi,t+ 6
7
− Li,t+ 6
7
= Ki,t+ 6
7
(59)
It may happen that the firm has not enough money to pay back the
loan at the due date. We have see that in a such case the bank is always
accommodating. However, the loan quality is then downgraded, with
the consequence that the firm cannot distribute dividends until this
debt is totally paid back40. Finally, if a firm is unable to pay back a
loan rated doubtfulDebt at the due date, it is declared bankrupt by the
bank. Then the firm disappears, together with its debt, its machinery,
and its inventories.
The possibility of firm exit leads to the question of firm entry.
Indeed, in the current simplified version of the model, there is no en-
dogenous mechanism of new firm creation from the willingness of the
agents. Thus, the bankruptcies lead necessarily to a progressive and
irreversible reduction of the number of firms with the progress of the
simulations. That is the reason why, each time a firm exits the sim-
ulation, a similar firm (same number of machines, same productivity)
is created 12 months later. So we are sure that the number of firms
present in the model is a constant on the long term.
5.4 Households
A household is represented by a Household object. Each household is
endowed with a LaborPower object that represents its labor power41.
40Indeed, we have seen that the bank tries to obtain the reimbursement of a loan rated
doubtfulDebt at each end of period, without waiting the term. Consequently, all possible
profits realized by the firm are allocated first to the reimbursement of the loan and until
the loan is totally paid back, no money is available on the account of the firm at the
beginning of the period, at the time to distribute dividends.
41See the description of the laborPower object, page 11.
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In each time period, jobless households search for a job on the
labor market. Employed households receive a wage and spend their
labor force onto the machines of their employer. Subsequently, the
households expend a share of their available balance in the purchase
of commodities on the goods market. In a period, each household has
to make a decision about two questions:
• What lowest wage it would accept?
• How much to spend on the goods market and how much to save?
As for the firms, the behavior of the households is modeled as
a sequence of simple adjustment procedures. The state of a given
household is defined by a set of variables (table 7, page 47). The
household compares the value of some of these variables with a set of
normal values shared by all households which are given as exogenous
parameters (table 7, page 47). Depending on the gap between these
state variables and the normal values, the household adjusts its control
variables (table 9 page 48) upward or downward.
Dj,t the dividend received by the household for the period.
Wj,t the wage received by the household for the period.
Y aj,t the annual income, i.e. the total of the incomes (wages
et dividends) received during the last 12 months.
Sj,t the liquid savings of the household.
Mj,t the available balance of the houshold.
duj,t the number of consecutive periods without job.
Table 7: State variables of the household j
5.4.1 Dividend payments
Each firm and the bank is owned by a household. These households
are selected at random, at the beginning of the simulation, to represent
the owners of each firm and of the bank. They will remain the owner
of their firm for the whole existence of this firm and, in the case of the
bank, for the full length of the simulation.
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d rH the normal duration (in months) of resistance to a drop
of the reservation wage.
sH the saving propensity.
νW
∗
H the monthly maximal flexibility of the reservation wage.
µSH the propensity to spend the excess of savings.
Table 8: Normal (exogenous) values of the households sector
W ∗j,t the reservation wage.
S∗j,t the saving target.
C∗j,t the consumption target.
Table 9: Control variables of the household j
An owner of a firm or of the bank distinguishes itself from other
households as it receives, at the beginning of the period, a dividend
paid by the firm or the bank. This phase takes place between the time
(t+ 07) and the time (t+
2
7) of the period.
This dividend (Dj,t) makes up into the income of the houshold. It
takes the form of a check that the household deposits immediately on
its account.
Mj,t+ 2
7
= Mj,t+ 0
7
+Dj,t (60)
5.4.2 Reservation wage and job search
Between the time (t + 37) and the time (t +
4
7) of the period, the
households have to update their reservation wage (W ∗j,t), i.e. the lowest
wage at which they will accept a job. The length of unemployment of
the household (duj,t) plays a central role in the procedure of adjustment
of the reservation wage42.
42In the current version of the model, unemployed households do not get any assistance
or benefit. If we introduce unemployment benefits in a new version of the model, the
we will have to modify the procedure of adjustment of the reservation wage to take into
account the level of these benefits. We will also have to complete this behavior for taking
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Step 1: Observation The household begins by examining its sit-
uation. If the household is employed, its reservation wage is defined
as the last wage received.
W ∗j,t = Wj,t−1 (61)
An employed household does not search for a job and the procedure
terminates.
If the household is jobless, it calculates the length of unemployment
(duj,t), i.e. the number of periods since its last job.
Step 2: Decision The jobless household then decides to main-
tain its reservation wage or to adjust it downward. The decision of
adjustment depends on the length of unemployment (duj,t) and on the
household resistance (drH). The scale of the adjustment is chosen at
random in the interval [0, νW ∗H ].
δW
∗
j,t =
{
βνW
∗
H if α <
duj,t
drH
,
0 else.
(62)
The variables α and β are random variables determined at each use
on a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1]. We see that the
probability of an adjustment rises with the unemployment length.
Step 3: Adjustment of the reservation wage In the case
of a positive decision, the household adjusts downward its reservation
wage (W ∗j,t).
W ∗j,t = (1− δW
∗
j,t )W
∗
j,t−1 (63)
The variable α is a random variable determined at each use on a uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1].
Step 4: Job search Each jobless household is registered on the
labor market43. A jobless household consults a limited number of job
offers, selected at random in the list of offers posted by employers on
the labor market. The household chooses from this selection the offer
with the highest wage. If this wage is higher or equal to its reservation
into account the level of available balance of the household (precautionary saving).
43See the description of the labor market, page 18.
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wage, the household accepts the job and is immediately hired44, else
it refuses the job and remains jobless in this period.
The recruitment of a household by a firm results in a labor contract
that specifies the amount of the wage and the contract duration. The
wage is the wage offered by the firm on the labor market. The duration
of the contract is selected at random. A household never leaves a job
at its own initiative45. However, it can be fired at any time if the
employer decides to reduce the level of the production.
5.4.3 Work
After the job search phase, but still between the time (t+ 37) and the
time (t + 47) of the period, the employed households have to work for
their employers.
Each employed household receives the wage (Wj,t) specified in its
job contract as a check that it deposits immediately on its bank ac-
count.
Mj,t+ 4
7
= Mj,t+ 3
7
+Wj,t (64)
In return for this wage46, the household supplies its labor power to the
firm, which consumes it in the production process47.
5.4.4 Saving and consumption
The next phase of the period — between the time (t+ 47) and the time
(t+ 57) — is dedicated to household consumption and saving.
Each household has to determine its spending target (C∗j,t). We
assume that the households try to maintain a “normal” level of con-
44We have seen that the firm accepts all applicants, in the limit of its vacancies. See
the description of the recruitment procedure by the firms, page 40.
45In the current version of the model, the behavior of the households is very simple,
with a perfectly loyal behavior of workers. This behavior can be complexified in a future
version by integrating “voice” and “exit” behaviors inspired from the work of Hirschman
(1970).
46 If one tries to make a household work while this household has not been paid in
the period, then an error is generated and the simulation breaks off. This usually never
happens, since the firms make sure that all wages are paid before making their employees
work. But the encapsulation of this control within the Household object guarantees that
no one works for free in the modeled economy, independently from the implementation of
the behavior of the firms.
47See the section dedicated to the objects of the real sphere, page 9.
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sumption: each household sets aside a precautionary reserve to smooth
consumption in the future if the income drops48.
Step 1: Observation The household begins by calculating its
saving target (S∗j,t), proportional to the income of the last 12 months
(Y aj,t).
S∗j,t = sHY
a
j,t (65)
Then the household calculates its effective saving (Sj,t+ 4
7
), i.e. its
available balance (Mj,t+ 4
7
) minus its average monthly income calcu-
lated on the 12 last months.
Sj,t+ 4
7
= Mj,t+ 4
7
− Y
a
j,t
12
(66)
Step 2: Decision The household compares its effective saving
(Sj,t+ 4
7
) to its target (S∗j,t). If the effective saving is lower than the
target, it decides to spend only a fraction of its average monthly in-
come. Else, it decides to spend the total of its average monthly income,
plus a fraction (µSH) of the excess saving.
C∗j,t =

(1− sH)
Y aj,t
12
if Sj,t+ 4
7
− S∗j,t < 0
Y aj,t
12
+ µSH(Sj,t+ 4
7
− S∗j,t) else.
(67)
Step 3: Spending Then the household goes to the goods market
where it attempts to realize its consumption target with a limited
number of providers49. Two factors can frustrate the household and
limit its effective spending (Cj,t).
48These savings are deposited on the current account of the household, on which the
bank pays no interest. It is true that if the household is the owner of a firm or of the bank,
then its total savings include not only money deposit but also the capital of the owned firm
or of the bank. Nonetheless, in the current version of the model, for the sake of simplicity,
the household behavior does not take into account the capital owned and only the liquid
saving is considered. Consequently, although the saving behavior is defined in the same
way for a jobless household, for an employed household, and for a rentier household, the
effective rate of savings of the rentiers will be very higher than those of other households
on average.
49See the section devoted to the goods market, page 18.
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First, the available balance can be lower than the consumption tar-
get (Mj,t+ 4
7
< C∗j,t). As in the current version the model, the house-
holds have no access to the credit, the spending cannot be higher than
the available balance.
Second, shortage situations can sometimes occur on the goods mar-
ket, then some households cannot spend the totality of their budget.
The household pays its purchases with checks on its bank account.
The commodity bought is immediately consumed (it disappears). The
effective saving of the household is equal to the available balance after
the consumption.
Mj,t+ 5
7
= Mj,t+ 4
7
− Cj,t (68)
Sj,t+ 5
7
= Mj,t+ 5
7
(69)
6 Conclusion
As stated by Cohen (1960), the computer frees us from the limits of the
traditional mathematical tools and allows to model macroeconomies
as complex dynamic systems with a high level of realism.
“The main advantage of using computer simulation as a
tool in economics is to provide a concrete procedure for
formulating and testing hypotheses. A frequent objection
raised against traditional mathematical models of economic
systems is that these models are too unrealistic for their in-
tended purposes. This is often true, because adding realism
requires adding complexity as well. Since traditional math-
ematical models are intended for analytical solution, their
complexity and realism must be severely limited. Computer
models, however, can be made as complex and realistic as
our theories permit, for analytical solutions to these models
are unnecessary. No matter how complicated the formula-
tion of the model, simulation techniques enable us to trace
the consequences inherent in it. Hence, microeconomic the-
ories can be cast into precise models without distortion of
the meaning embodied in these theories, and the descrip-
tion of the world implied by such theories can be readily
determined.” (Cohen 1960, p. 2)
For a long time, the project of Cohen seemed idealistic. But now,
with the growing capacity of computers and the development of high
52
level programming languages like Java, it appears not only feasible,
but highly desirable.
So, following the bottom-up approach, we have put in place, all
the software components that our project requires. We started by
building the simplest objects, representing real and monetary objects
from the real world. Then we have constructed the markets, not as
singular agents in charge of the system equilibrium, but as passive
institutions, simple places where agents establish direct relationships.
Finally, we have developed the three types of agents that populate the
model. We have designed these agents as simple automats endowed
with some autonomy, thanks to a set of adjustment procedures. All
these elementary components are the models of objects or agents of
the real word. Thus the resulting macroeconomic model is designed as
a model populated with numerous interacting models.
Within this model based only on simple and realistic assumptions
about agents, one can carry out several macroeconomic experimenta-
tions leading to the emergence of macroproperties and macrobehaviors
unobservable within classical models based on the representative agent
framework (Seppecher 2010a, Seppecher 2011, Seppecher 2012). For
this reason, we consider that the model provides the core around which
it could be feasible to develop models more complex and highly real-
istic for a wide range of applications.
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